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I. INTRODUCTION
In Good-Bye Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 1 Professors Judy M. Cornett and Michael H.
Hoffheimer identify a number of legal issues that will become the focus of
litigation after Daimler.2 This Response identifies an additional, perhaps
surprising issue that is currently being litigated in the wake of Daimler AG v.
Bauman. In the lower federal courts, defendants who have litigated cases on
the merits without raising lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense are filing
motions to dismiss and arguing that they are not subject to general jurisdiction
in the forum under Daimler’s “at home” standard. The question is whether
these defendants have waived their jurisdictional defense under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12 because it was “available” to them in 2011 after

* Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law. B.A., Oberlin College;

M.P.P., Vanderbilt University; J.D., University of Tennessee College of Law.
1 Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts:
General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101 (2015).
2 See id. at 136‒55 (stating that the following issues will become the focus of
litigation after Daimler: whether appointment of an agent for purposes of service of process
can constitute effective consent to either specific or general jurisdiction, the scope of
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion, the proper application of Daimler’s comparative approach, the
role of corporate expectations in general jurisdiction, the identification of “place of
incorporation” and “principal place of business,” and the “exceptional circumstances” that
will render a corporation “essentially at home” somewhere other than its place of
incorporation and principal place of business).
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Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown 3 was decided.4 This
Response explains the doctrine of waiver under Rule 12 and examines three
cases that have addressed waiver under Goodyear and Daimler.5 This
Response then asserts that defendants who failed to argue that they were not
“at home” in the forum after Goodyear waived their jurisdictional defense and
should not be permitted to raise it under Daimler.

II. WAIVER OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION AS A DEFENSE UNDER RULE 12
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(1), lack of personal
jurisdiction is a “threshold defense” that is “waived if [it is] not included in a
preliminary motion under Rule 12 as required by Rule 12(g) or, if no such
motion is made, [is] not included in the responsive pleading or an amendment
as of right to that pleading under Rule 15(a).” 6 This Rule is not absolute,
however. If the defendant omits a personal jurisdiction defense from a Rule
12(b) motion to dismiss or a responsive pleading because it was unavailable at
the time, then he does not waive it. 7 He can assert the new defense in a second
Rule 12(b) motion or in his answer, 8 but he must raise it “as soon as [its]
cognizability is made apparent.”9 Although the case law in this area is sparse,
3 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
4 This issue first came to my attention in an email sent by Professor Kevin M.

Clermont to the Civil Procedure Listserv on Thursday, Oct. 2, 2014. The discussion on the
Listserv prompted me to write this Response on the topic of waiver and pointed me
towards several cases that are cited herein.
5 The three cases are (1) Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, 8
F. Supp. 3d 9 (D.D.C. 2014), (2) American. Fidelity Assurance Co. v. Bank of New York
Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284-D, 2014 WL 4471606 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2014), and (3)
Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2014).
6 5C CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. M ILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1391, at 498 (2004) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2), (g), (h)(1)).
7 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(g)(2) (“Except as provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a party that
makes a motion under this rule must not make another motion under this rule raising a
defense . . . that was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion.”) (emphasis
added); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1)(A) (stating that a party waives the defense of lack of
personal jurisdiction by “omitting it from a motion in the circumstances described in Rule
12(g)(2)”); see also WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 6, § 1388, at 491 (“A significant
qualification on the application of Federal Rule 12(g) is that a party is only required to
consolidate Rule 12 defenses and objections that are ‘then available to the party.’”); Glater
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 712 F.2d 735, 738 (1st Cir. 1983) (stating that the “language of Rule
12(g) logically also applies to Rule 12(h) with the result that under that subsection
defendants do not waive the defense of personal jurisdiction if it was not available at the
time they made their first defensive move”).
8 WRIGHT & M ILLER, supra note 6, § 1388, at 491‒92 (stating that a party can file a
second motion to dismiss “based on a defense that he or she did not have reasonable notice
of at the time that party first filed a motion to dismiss or on a defense that became available
only after a motion had been made under Rule 12” or “assert the newly revealed
defense . . . in the responsive pleading”).
9 Holzsager v. Valley Hosp., 646 F.2d 792, 796 (2d Cir. 1981).
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the courts that have addressed the issue have concluded that a defense is
unavailable under Rule 12(g)(2) “if its legal basis did not exist at the time of
the answer or pre-answer motion.”10 In other words, a defendant does not
waive a threshold defense where “for all practical purposes” binding precedent
makes it “impossible” for the defendant to raise it in his first response to the
complaint.11
In Holzsager v. Valley Hospital, an oft-cited waiver case, the Second
Circuit found that the defendant did not waive its personal jurisdiction defense
because the defense became available only after the U.S. Supreme Court
overruled controlling Second Circuit authority.12 In Holzsager, the plaintiff
sued the defendant hospital in 1976 and established jurisdiction over it by
attaching an insurance policy issued to the defendant by a New York insurance
company.13 At the time, Seider v. Roth, a decision from the Court of Appeals
of New York, authorized “the exercise of personal jurisdiction through quasiin-rem attachment of insurance policies issued by resident insurers.” 14 Despite
criticism of Seider-type jurisdiction and Supreme Court precedent that called
its constitutionality into question, 15 the Second Circuit reaffirmed Seider in
1978 in O’Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp.16 Then, in Rush v. Savchuck, “the
Supreme Court declared Seider-type attachments unconstitutional.”17
Shortly thereafter the defendant in Holzsager moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, and the plaintiff responded that the defendant had
waived its jurisdictional defense. 18 The Second Circuit first held that the
defendant did, in fact, timely assert a personal jurisdiction defense that was
broad enough to include the argument that jurisdiction under Seider was
unconstitutional.19 Nevertheless, the court concluded that even if the defendant
had not previously raised its personal jurisdiction defense, it would not have
10 Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804, 813 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing

Holzsager, 646 F.2d at 796; Glater, 712 F.2d at 738–39).
11 See id.; Holzsager, 646 F.2d at 793–96; see also Hawknet, Ltd. v. Overseas
Shipping Agencies, 590 F.3d 87, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2009). In the context of a Rule 60(b)
motion for relief from a judgment, the First Circuit has similarly held that it “will excuse a
party for failing to raise a defense only when the defense, if timely asserted, would have
been futile under binding precedent.” Bennett v. City of Holyoke, 362 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
2004). Generally, it is “futile” to raise a defense “only if (i) at the time of the procedural
default, a prior authoritative decision indicated that the defense was unavailable, and (ii)
the defense became available thereafter by way of supervening authority (say, an
overruling of the prior decision or a legislative clarification).” Id.
12 Holzsager, 646 F.2d at 796.
13 Id. at 794.
14 Id. (citing Seider v. Roth, 216 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1966)).
15 Id. at 795 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)).
16 Id. (citing O’Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1034 (1978)).
17 Id. (citing Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980)).
18 See Holzsager, 646 F.2d at 795.
19 Id. at 795–96.
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waived the defense under Rules 12(g) and (h). The court reasoned that the
legal basis for the defense did not exist until the Supreme Court overruled
O’Connor in Rush, and a right that is unknown cannot be waived.20 According
to the Second Circuit, “[t]he clairvoyance demanded by [the] plaintiff . . . of
the [defendant was] inconsistent with the doctrine of waiver.” 21
Similarly, in Hawknet, Ltd. v. Overseas Shipping Agencies, a maritime
attachment lawsuit, the Second Circuit said that “the doctrine of waiver
demands conscientiousness, not clairvoyance, from parties.” 22 In Hawknet, the
plaintiff argued that the defendant could not raise its personal jurisdiction
defense on appeal because it had failed to raise it in the district court. 23 The
court agreed with the plaintiff’s argument generally, but held that waiver was
inapplicable on the facts of the case because controlling Second Circuit
precedent had prevented the defendant from raising its jurisdictional defense in
the district court. 24 It was not until the Second Circuit overruled that precedent
while the Hawknet appeal was pending that the defendant had “a new
objection to the District Court’s jurisdiction over it.” 25 In these circumstances,
the appellate court concluded that the defendant did not waive its personal
jurisdiction defense by raising it for the first time on appeal.26

III. WAIVER UNDER GOODYEAR AND DAIMLER: THE CASE LAW
Currently, the lower federal courts are wrestling with the question of
whether Daimler AG v. Bauman provides defendants with a jurisdictional
defense that was unavailable before Daimler was decided on January 14, 2014,
or whether that defense was waived by the defendants’ failure to quickly assert
it after the Supreme Court decided Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v.
Brown in 2011. In these cases, the initial complaint was filed long before
Daimler was decided, but the defendants did not raise personal jurisdiction as
a defense. In particular, they did not argue that general personal jurisdiction
was lacking because they were not “at home” in the forum under Goodyear.
Then, shortly after the decision in Daimler, the defendants moved to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction on the ground that Daimler had changed the
law of general personal jurisdiction and under Daimler they were not “at
home” in the forum. The plaintiffs responded that the defendants had waived
their defense under Rule 12(g)(2) by failing to timely assert it.
In Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, for example,
the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit on April 18, 2001, against the Palestinian Interim
20 See id. at 796 (citing Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 143, 145 (1967)).
21 Id.
22 Hawknet, Ltd. v. Overseas Shipping Agencies, 590 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2009).
23 Id. at 91 & n.8 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1) for the proposition “that a party

can waive its right to challenge the district court’s personal jurisdiction over it”).
24 See id. at 91–92.
25 Id. at 92.
26 Id.
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Self-Government Authority (PA), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
and eleven individual defendants in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia.27 The PA and PLO filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, which the district court denied
in 2006.28 They did not formally raise lack of personal jurisdiction as a
defense until February 10, 2014, when they filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings for lack of personal jurisdiction 29 and argued that under Daimler
“their contacts with the District of Columbia [did] not render them ‘at home’”
there.30
Similarly, in American Fidelity Assurance Co. v. Bank of New York
Mellon, the plaintiff filed suit on November 1, 2011, in the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma. 31 The defendant moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim in response to both the initial and second amended
complaints but did not raise lack of personal jurisdiction as a defense in either
motion.32 The court denied the defendants’ second 12(b)(6) motion on
December 26, 2013, and the defendant filed an answer on January 10, 2014. 33
The defendant then moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on
March 3, 2014, and argued that general jurisdiction was lacking in light of
Daimler.34 Like the defendants in Gilmore, the defendant in American Fidelity
argued that Daimler changed the law and created a new legal basis for
challenging general personal jurisdiction. 35 More specifically, the defendant in
American Fidelity argued that it was subject to general jurisdiction in
Oklahoma before Daimler because it had continuous and systematic contacts
with Oklahoma and controlling Tenth Circuit authority prevented it from
raising general jurisdiction as a defense until after Daimler was decided.36 The
defendant further argued that it was not subject to general jurisdiction in
Oklahoma after Daimler because it was neither incorporated nor had its
principal place of business there.37
In both Gilmore and American Fidelity, the district courts held that the
defendants had waived their jurisdictional defense by failing to assert it
promptly after Goodyear.38 Both courts reasoned first and most significantly
that the defense of lack of general personal jurisdiction was available to the
defendants after Goodyear because Goodyear, not Daimler, announced the
27 Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 8 F. Supp. 3d 9, 11 (D.D.C. 2014).
28 Id. at 12.
29 See id. at 12–14.
30 Id. at 15.
31 Am. Fidelity Assurance Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284-D, 2014

WL 4471606, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2014).
32 See id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at *1, *2–3.
35 Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15; Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *1.
36 Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *1, *2–3.
37 Id. at *2.
38 Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15; Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *5.
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new “at home” rule and the Daimler Court merely applied it. 39 Second, both
courts found, contrary to the defendants’ arguments, that Justice Sotomayor
did not state in her concurrence that the “at home” rule itself was novel. 40
Rather, she said that the majority’s interpretation of the “at home” rule—
“namely that a foreign defendant’s contacts with the forum must be ‘viewed in
comparison to the company’s nationwide and worldwide activities,’”—was
novel and unprecedented. 41 This part of the majority’s holding, however, was
not at issue in either of the district court cases.42
Finally, both the Gilmore and American Fidelity courts examined the
lower courts’ treatment of the Goodyear decision. The Gilmore court noted
that more than 250 federal cases discussed the “at home” standard in the
period between the Goodyear and Daimler decisions.43 Similarly, the
American Fidelity court pointed out that the circuit courts have concluded that
Daimler reaffirmed Goodyear’s “at home” standard for general personal
jurisdiction over corporations and “have not presumed general jurisdiction is
lacking if the corporation’s place of incorporation or principal place of
business is not in the forum state.”44 The American Fidelity court also rejected
the defendant’s argument that pre-Goodyear Tenth Circuit precedent
prevented it from raising its jurisdictional defense until after Daimler was
decided because controlling circuit precedent from 2012 “clearly relie[d] upon
the ‘at-home’ standard announced in Goodyear” and “existed . . . well before
the Supreme Court’s Daimler decision.”45 In the end, both the Gilmore and
American Fidelity courts held that the defendants had forfeited their general
personal jurisdiction defenses and denied their motions to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction.
In contrast, in Gucci America, Inc. v. Weixing Li, the Second Circuit held
on similar facts that a non-party had not waived its jurisdictional defense. 46 In
39 Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15 (stating that the defendants were “flat-out wrong that
Daimler was the genesis of the [at home] rule” because that “standard was unmistakably
announced in Goodyear”); Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *3 (stating that “multiple
statements by the Court in Daimler demonstrate that the [at home] standard . . . was clearly
first expressed in Goodyear”).
40 Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15 n.2; Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *4.
41 Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15 n.2 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746,
770 (2014)); Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *4.
42 See Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 14–15 (noting that the defendants specifically argued
that their contacts with the forum did not render them at home in the District of Columbia);
Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *4 (stating that Justice Sotomayor “was addressing a
holding of the Court not relied upon by [the] Defendant”).
43 Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 16.
44 Am. Fidelity, 2014 WL 4471606, at *4 (citing Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova
Holding, A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 222 (2d Cir. 2014); Snodgrass v. Berklee Coll. of Music, 559
F. App’x 541, 542 (7th Cir. 2014); Gilmore, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 15).
45 Id.
46 See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li , 768 F.3d 122, 125‒29, 134‒36 (2d Cir. 2014);
see also Laydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 2015 WL 1499185 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015)

Vol. 76]

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE

73

Gucci, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York on June 25, 2010.47 The district court issued a
preliminary injunction that explicitly applied to a non-party foreign bank, and
the plaintiffs served the bank with the injunction at its New York City branch
in July of 2010.48 In 2011 and 2012, the district court ordered the bank to
comply with the injunction and denied the bank’s motions to modify the
injunction and for reconsideration.49 The bank appealed.50 After oral argument
in the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court decided Daimler and the bank raised
the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction for the first time. 51 Relying on
Hawknet, Ltd. v. Overseas Shipping Agencies, the Second Circuit held that the
bank was not subject to general jurisdiction in New York because its contacts
were not “so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in
the forum.”52 It had “only four branch offices in the United States and only a
small portion of its worldwide business is conducted in New York.” 53
In reaching its decision, the Gucci court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument
that the bank had waived its jurisdictional defense by failing to raise it in the
district court.54 The court held that the defense was unavailable in the district
court because it would have been directly contrary to controlling Second
Circuit precedent for the bank to argue that it was not subject to general
personal jurisdiction in New York before Daimler was decided.55 The court
explained in a footnote that Daimler and the Supreme Court’s other general
jurisdiction cases are applicable to non-parties.56 At the same time, however,
the court pointed out in a different footnote that the bank was not subject to the
waiver provisions in Rules 12(g) and (h) because it was a not a “‘party’ that
could fail to assert its personal jurisdiction defense in an answer or a motion to
dismiss.”57

(finding under Gucci that a 12(b)(2) jurisdictional defense was not available before
Daimler, but holding that several defendants have nonetheless waived their jurisdictional
objection by waiting for seven months after Daimler was decided to raise it).
47 Gucci, 768 F.3d at 126.
48 Id.
49 See id. at 127–28.
50 Id. at 128.
51 See id. at 134–35.
52 Id. at 135 (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 & n.19 (2014)).
53 Gucci, 768 F.3d at 135.
54 See id. at 135, 136 & n.14.
55 See id. at 135–36 (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93–95
(2d Cir. 2000)); Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 57–58 (2d Cir.
1985); Dietrich v. Bauer, No. 95 Civ. 7051 (RWS), 2000 WL 1171132, at *4 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 16, 2000)); see also supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text (discussing Hawknet,
Ltd. v. Overseas Shipping Agencies).
56 Gucci, 768 F.3d at 134 n.13.
57 Id. at 136 n.14.
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IV. WAIVER UNDER GOODYEAR AND DAIMLER: AN ANALYSIS
Gilmore and American Fidelity Assurance Co. raise the intriguing
question of when the Rule 12 threshold defense of lack of personal jurisdiction
should be deemed “unavailable” so that failure to raise it in the first response
to the complaint does not result in its waiver under Rules 12(g) and (h). The
limited circuit case law in this area suggests that this exception to Rule 12’s
waiver doctrine is applicable only where controlling legal authority makes it
impossible to raise the defense in a pre-answer motion or answer.58 This
standard itself suggests that a defense is unavailable under Rule 12 if it would
violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) for the defendant (or his
attorney) to assert it. In other words, if the defense is not “warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or
reversing existing law or for establishing new law,” then it is “unavailable”
and not subject to waiver. 59 At the same time, however, if a new rule is
announced and the controlling authority is overruled or called into question,
the defendant must assert his jurisdictional defense promptly or he will forfeit
it.
The narrow reach of this exception is appropriate given the purpose of
Rule 12’s waiver provisions, “which is the avoidance of time-consuming,
piece-meal litigation of pre-trial motions.”60 Unless this exception is carefully
circumscribed, defendants will frequently argue that a threshold defense was
unavailable to them and therefore their failure to timely raise it should be
excused. Moreover, there is no reason that a different standard should apply to
a non-party once the non-party is on notice that it has become a participant in
the litigation, as the bank in Gucci was once it was served with an injunction.
The efficiency concerns that drive Rule 12’s waiver provision apply equally to
pre-trial motions by non-parties.
Under the waiver standard set forth above, the defendants in Gilmore and
American Fidelity and the non-party bank in Gucci waived their jurisdictional
defenses by failing to assert them promptly after Goodyear was decided
because there was no controlling authority that made it impossible for them to
raise their jurisdictional defenses. 61 Indeed, the Goodyear decision provided
58 See supra notes 12–28 and accompanying text.
59 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (stating that when an attorney presents a defense to the

court, he is certifying that “to the best of [his] knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,” that the defense is “warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing
law or for establishing new law”).
60 WRIGHT & M ILLER, supra note 6, § 1391, at 506 (quoting Tiernan v. Dunn, 295 F.
Supp. 1253 (D.R.I. 1969)).
61 Although Rule 12 was inapplicable to the non-party bank in Gucci, the Second
Circuit appeared to apply the Rule 12 waiver standard set forth above when it held that the
bank had not waived its jurisdictional defense because controlling Second Circuit
precedent prevented the bank from raising it until after Daimler was decided. See Gucci,
768 F.3d at 135–36.
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defendants with a legal basis to argue that general jurisdiction was lacking
because they were not “at home” in the forum.
Prior to Goodyear, the law regarding general jurisdiction over
corporations “was so well settled that large corporations . . . did not even
challenge general jurisdiction over them.”62 Thus, when the lawsuits in
Gilmore and American Fidelity were filed and the bank in Gucci was served
with the injunction, it was unlikely that the defendants or the bank could have
raised general personal jurisdiction as a defense. 63 After Goodyear, however,
the law was unclear. The Goodyear Court “articulated a new standard” and
“adopted a more restrictive approach” to general jurisdiction when it
announced the “at home” rule, but it did not explain how narrowly that rule
should be applied.64 While the Goodyear Court indicated that a corporation is
subject to general jurisdiction at its place of incorporation and principal place
of business, “the opinion did not restrict general jurisdiction to those
‘paradigm’ places.”65 Moreover, the Court’s “evaluation of the sales” in
Goodyear suggested “that the Court might adopt a comparative approach
under which contacts outside the state might reduce the likelihood that a
corporation’s in-state activity would constitute a home in the state.” 66 Not
surprisingly “[c]ourts and commentators reached different conclusions about
whether the place where a corporation was ‘at home’ after Goodyear included
places where it engaged in substantial activity outside its place of
incorporation or principal place of business.”67 Given the uncertainty in the
law after Goodyear, there was no legal authority that made it futile for
defendants to raise their jurisdictional arguments until after Daimler was
decided.
In contrast, in Holzsager v. Valley Hospital, a case where the Second
Circuit found that the defendant did not waive its jurisdictional defense under
Rule 12, the personal jurisdiction doctrine at issue there had been criticized
and called into question by the Supreme Court but was then reaffirmed by the
Second Circuit.68 Thus, it was impossible for the defendant to raise its
personal jurisdiction defense until the Supreme Court overruled the controlling
62 Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 2, at 104.
63 The district courts in Gilmore and American Fidelity did not identify the

defendants’ contacts with the forums in those cases, but it seems likely they did not have
an argument against general personal jurisdiction until after Goodyear was decided. In
Gucci, however, it was clear that the bank’s contacts with New York subjected it to general
jurisdiction there under pre-Goodyear authority, and, therefore, it would have been
pointless for the bank to argue that it was not subject to general jurisdiction until after
Goodyear was decided. See Gucci, 768 F.3d at 135–36.
64 See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 2, at 105–06, 127.
65 Id. at 6. The argument that general jurisdiction over corporations should be
restricted to the place of incorporation and principal place of business originated in the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s amicus brief in Goodyear. Id. at 6 n.17.
66 Id. at 23.
67 Id. at 23 n.60 (citing various sources).
68 See supra notes 12–18 and accompanying text.
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Second Circuit authority in Rush v. Savchuk.69 Similarly, in Hawknet, Ltd. v.
Overseas Shipping Agencies, a maritime attachment case cited by the Gucci
court, the Second Circuit held that controlling precedent made it impossible
for the defendant to raise its jurisdictional defense until the Second Circuit
overruled that case law while the Hawknet appeal was pending. 70
In American Fidelity, the defendant tried to argue that pre-Goodyear Tenth
Circuit authority made it impossible to raise a jurisdictional defense until after
Daimler was decided.71 The district court rejected the defendant’s argument,
however, because controlling Tenth Circuit precedent from 2012 “clearly
relie[d] upon the ‘at-home’ standard.”72 In contrast, in Gucci the Second
Circuit held that the bank had not waived its jurisdictional defense because it
would have been directly contrary to controlling Second Circuit authority for
the bank to raise it pre-Daimler.73 To support this statement, the court cited
three pre-Goodyear decisions from the Second Circuit that “made it clear that
a foreign bank with a branch in New York” was subject to general jurisdiction
there.74 In one of those cases, Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., the
Second Circuit concluded that general jurisdiction was not available under
New York’s long-arm statute but did not reach the constitutional issue. 75
Moreover, the Gucci court neglected to cite or discuss the import of
Second Circuit cases decided in between Goodyear and Daimler that clearly
recognized the “at home” standard.76 Perhaps most significantly, the Gucci
court did not cite any Second Circuit cases in between Goodyear and Daimler
that applied the at home standard and specifically held that a defendant or nonparty with contacts similar to those of the bank in Gucci was subject to general
personal jurisdiction in New York. And notably, the court did not mention
Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding, A.S., a Second Circuit case decided
only a few months before Gucci in which the court said that both Goodyear
and Daimler “make clear that even a company’s ‘engage[ment] in a
69 See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 22–28 and accompanying text.
71 See Am. Fidelity Assurance Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284-D,

2014 WL 4471606, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2014).
72 Id.
73 See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 135, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2014).
74 Id. at 136 (citing Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 93–95 (2d Cir.
2000)); see Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 57–58 (2d Cir. 1985);
Dietrich v. Bauer, No. 95 Civ. 7051 (RWS), 2000 WL 1171132, at *4 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
16, 2000)).
75 Hoffritz, 763 F.2d at 57–58.
76 See In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714 F.3d 659, 674 (2d. Cir. 2013)
(quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853–54
(2011)) (proposing that the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction over a
corporation is where it is “fairly regarded as at home”); Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese
Canadian Bank, SAL, 732 F.3d 161, 169 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting the “at home” rule
from Goodyear); Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 60 n.9
(2d Cir. 2012) (same).
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substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business’ is alone insufficient
to render it at home in a forum.”77
Thus, despite the pre-Goodyear authority relied upon by the Second
Circuit in Gucci and contrary to the Gucci court’s holding, it was not
impossible for the bank to raise a jurisdictional defense after Goodyear.
Because the law of general jurisdiction over corporations was unclear after
Goodyear and it was uncertain just how much the Court had narrowed that
doctrine, a legal basis existed to argue that general jurisdiction was lacking.
The bank in Gucci had four branch offices in the United States and conducted
only a limited amount of its business in New York.78 After Goodyear, it was at
least arguable on those facts that the bank was not “at home” in New York. Put
differently, if the bank had raised its 12(b)(2) jurisdictional defense under
Goodyear, it would not have violated Rule 11(b)(2) because the argument that
the court lacked general personal jurisdiction over it was warranted by existing
law or a nonfrivolous argument for extending existing law. The defense
therefore was available before Daimler was decided.79 Thus, under the Rule
12 waiver standard the bank in Gucci, like the defendants in Gilmore and
American Fidelity, waived its jurisdictional argument by failing to assert it
quickly after Goodyear.

V. CONCLUSION
Because Daimler AG v. Bauman was decided over one year ago, the
specific issue raised by this Response—whether a defendant who failed to
raise a general personal jurisdiction defense under Goodyear can assert it
under Daimler—will eventually become moot. Nevertheless, the broader
question of when a threshold defense is “unavailable” under Rule 12 deserves
additional scholarly attention given the dearth of case law in this area and
especially in light of cases like Gucci. Instead of evaluating whether Goodyear
made it possible for the bank to make a jurisdictional challenge, the Gucci
court essentially held that a jurisdictional argument was unavailable because
no controlling authority explicitly held that an entity like the bank was not
subject to general jurisdiction until Daimler was decided. If courts take this
approach to determining whether threshold defenses under Rule 12 are
unavailable, defendants will be more likely to raise these defenses later in
litigation and thereby seriously undermine the purpose of Rule 12’s waiver
doctrine.

77 Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding, A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2014)

(quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014)).
78 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
79 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).

